Abstract: In this paper, we propose a novel equilibrium solution notion for the time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem. This notion is called the mixed equilibrium solution, which consists of two parts: a pure-feedback-strategy part and an open-loop-control part. When the pure-feedbackstrategy part is zero or the open-loop-control part does not depend on the initial state, the mixed equilibrium solution reduces to the open-loop equilibrium control and the feedback equilibrium strategy, respectively. Using a maximum-principle-like methodology with forward-backward stochastic difference equations, a necessary and sufficient condition is established to characterize the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution. Then, by decoupling the forward-backward stochastic difference equations, three sets of difference equations, which together portray the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution, are obtained. Moreover, the case with a fixed time-state initial pair and the case with all the initial pairs are separately investigated. Furthermore, an example is constructed to show that the mixed equilibrium solution exists for all the initial pairs, although neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for some initial pairs.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a class of mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) control problems. The system dynamics are described by the following discrete-time stochastic difference equation (S∆E, for short)
where T = {0, . . . , N − 1}, T t = {t, · · · , N − 1} and A t,k ,Ā t,k , C
i t,k ∈ R n are deterministic matrices, and {X t k , k ∈ T t } X t and {u k , k ∈ T t } u with
T t = {t, 1, ..., N } are the state process and control process, respectively. The noise {w k , k ∈ T} is assumed to be a vector-valued martingale difference sequence defined on a probability space (Ω, F , P ) with
where ∆ k = (δ ij k ) p×p , k ∈ T, are assumed to be deterministic. E t [ · ] in (1.1) denotes the conditional mathematical expectation E[ · |F t ], where F t is defined as σ{w l , l = 0, 1, · · · , t − 1} and F 0 is understood as {∅, Ω}, and E k [ · ] in (1.2) is similarly defined. In (1.1), x belongs to l 2 F (t; R n ), which is defined as ζ ∈ R n ζ is F t -measurable, E|ζ| 2 < ∞ . We introduce the cost function J(t, x; u) =
where Q t,k ,Q t,k , R t,k ,R t,k , k ∈ T t , G t ,Ḡ t are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions, and q t,k , ρ t,k , k ∈ T t , g t are deterministic vectors. Let
Then, we pose the following optimal control problem.
Problem (LQ).
For the time-state initial pair (t, x), find u * ∈ l 2 F (T t ; R m ) such that J(t, x; u * ) = inf u∈l 2 F (Tt;R m )
J(t, x; u).
Compared with the standard stochastic LQ problems, Problem (LQ) has three unconventional features. First, the cost weighting and system matrices depend explicitly on the initial time t. Second, the term 2(F t x + g t )
T E t X t N makes J(t, x; u) a state-dependent (or rank-dependent) utility. Third, J(t, x; u) contains nonlinear terms of the conditional expectation of state and control. These three features are deeply rooted in the fields of economics and finance. The first feature is an abstraction of the general discounting functions; see [4, 14] for examples of hyperbolic discounting and quasi-geometric discounting. The second feature is of rank-dependent utility [5] , and a notable example of the third feature is the mean-variance utility [2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 17] . It is known that any of the three features will ruin the time consistency of the optimal control, namely, Bellman's principle of optimality will no longer work for Problem (LQ).
Problems with the nonlinear term of the conditional expectation (in the cost functional) are classified as mean-field stochastic optimal control problems [31] . Realizing the time inconsistency (called nonseparability there), Li and Ng [16] used an embedding scheme to derive the optimal policy for the multi-period meanvariance portfolio selection. Note that the optimal policy of [16] is with respect to the initial pair, that is, it is an optimal policy only when viewed at the initial time. This derivation is now called the pre-committed optimal solution. However, we find that a pre-committed optimal control (with respect to an initial pair) will no longer serve as an optimal control for an intertemporal initial pair. Although the pre-committed optimal solution is of some practical and theoretical value, it neglects and does not fully address the time inconsistency. Another approach is to handle the time inconsistency in a dynamic manner, by seeking timeconsistent equilibrium solutions instead of a pre-committed optimal control; this has mainly been motivated by practical applications in economics and finance, and has recently attracted considerable research interest.
The qualitative analysis of time inconsistency can be traced back to the ideas of the father of free market economics and moral philosopher Adam Smith [23] . In 1955, Strotz [24] gave the first quantitative formulation of time inconsistency and studied the general discounting problem. His approach successfully tackled time inconsistency using a lead-follower game with a hierarchical structure. Inspired by Strotz, hundreds of works have sought to tackle practical problems in economics and finance by focusing on the time inconsistency of dynamic systems described by ordinary difference or differential equations; see, for example, [9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 21] and the references therein. Unfortunately, as Ekeland [9, 10] pointed out, it is hard to prove the existence of Strotz's equilibrium policy. Therefore, it is necessary and of great importance to develop a general theory of time-inconsistent control. In recent years, this topic has attracted considerable attention from the theoretical control community; see, for example, [4, 12, 13, 25, 27, 29, 31] and the references therein.
With respect to the time-inconsistent LQ problems, two kinds of time-consistent equilibrium solutions have been investigated, namely, the open-loop equilibrium control and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy [12, 13, 27, 29, 31] . The two formulations are investigated separately because in dynamic game theory, openloop control differs significantly from the closed-loop strategy [3, 30] . To compare, the aim of open-loop formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium "control," while the "strategy" is the object of closed-loop formulation. Yong further developed Strotz's equilibrium solution [24] , which is essentially a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, into the LQ optimal control [27, 31] and the nonlinear optimal control [29, 28, 26] . The open-loop equilibrium control has been extensively studied by Hu-Jin-Zhou [12, 13] , Yong [31] , Ni-ZhangKrstic [18] , and Qi-Zhang [22] . In particularly, the closed-loop formulation can be viewed as an extension of Bellman's dynamic programming, and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if it exists) is constructed by a backward procedure [27, 28, 29, 31] . Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized via a maximum-principle-like methodology [12, 13, 18] .
It is well known that the aim of portfolio selection is to seek the best allocation of wealth among a basket of securities. The (single-period) mean-variance formulation initiated by Markowitz [17] is the cornerstone of modern portfolio theory and is widely used in both academic studies and the financial industry. The multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection is the natural extension of [17] , which has been extensively studied. Li-Ng [16] and Zhou-Li [32] were the first to report the analytical pre-commitment optimal policies for the discrete-time case and the continuous-time case, respectively. In fact, the multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem, which is a particular example of time-inconsistent problem, stimulated the recent developments in time-inconsistent problems and the revisits to multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection [2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13] .
In this paper, we examine the aforementioned Problem (LQ). In Section 2, we introduce the mixed equilibrium solution to Problem (LQ). The solution contains two different parts: a pure-feedback-strategy part and an open-loop-control part. By letting the open-loop-control part be independent of the initial state or the pure-feedback-strategy part be zero, the corresponding mixed equilibrium solution is reduced to a linear feedback equilibrium strategy and open-loop equilibrium control, respectively. Section 3 characterizes the mixed equilibrium solution using a maximum-principle-like methodology with convexity, stationarity, and forward-backward stochastic difference equations (FBS∆Es). It is shown that the convexity and stationarity conditions can be equivalently characterized via solutions to three sets of difference equations. Based on the results for the mixed equilibrium solution, we then obtain the results for the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy (with respect to a fixed initial pair). For the case with all the initial pairs, conditions in terms of solvability of three sets of difference equations are given to ensure the existence of mixed equilibrium solution. These conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Interestingly, for all of the initial pairs, the existence of general feedback equilibrium strategy is shown to be equivalent to the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which can be obtained by a backward procedure. Furthermore, the backward procedure works only when the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for all of the initial pairs, and cannot be applied to the case where we know only of the existence of a feedback equilibrium strategy for a fixed initial pair. Section 4 gives an example to illustrate the developed theory. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss future topics that are worth investigating. This paper makes the following novelties.
• Most of the existing results for time-inconsistent LQ problems are for the continuous-time case [12, 13, 26, 27, 29, 31] . The discrete-time multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem is a notable example of Problem (LQ), and its investigation calls for the development of general theory of discretetime time-inconsistent LQ optimal control. Furthermore, the model and methodology developed in this paper are more general than those in [18] .
• The notion of mixed equilibrium solution is introduced, and it seems that no similar notion has been reported for time-inconsistent optimal control. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established to characterize a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control as a mixed equilibrium solution (for a time-state initial pair). Using the notion of mixed equilibrium solution, the conditions to equivalently ensure the existence of an open-loop equilibrium control and a linear feedback equilibrium strategy can be simultaneously obtained. In other words, we can investigate the two equilibrium solutions in a unified way.
Importantly, the mixed equilibrium solution is not a hollow concept. In Section 4, it is shown that neither the open-loop equilibrium control nor the feedback equilibrium strategy exists for the initial pair (t, x) with t = 0, 1 and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R 2 ), although we are able to construct 10 mixed equilibrium solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to study the mixed equilibrium solution, which gives us more flexibility to deal with the time-inconsistent optimal control. The work of [19] serves as a companion to this paper in terms of testing our developed theory and pursuing the solvability of the multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem. The non-degenerate assumption was removed in [19] , which is popular in the literature on multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection. Neat conditions have been obtained in [19] to characterize the existence of the equilibrium solutions. To emphasize the dependence on the initial pair, Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x) is denoted as Problem (LQ) tx throughout this paper. Furthermore, for notational simplicity, we denote in this paper
Mixed equilibrium solution
Before introducing the mixed equilibrium solution, we give the definition of feedback equilibrium strategy. By a strategy, we mean a decision rule that a controller uses to select a control action based on the available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a mapping or an operator defined on the information set. Substituting the available information into a strategy, we obtain the open-loop value or realization of this strategy.
The set of this type of feedback strategies is denoted by F k , and 
Furthermore, in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), X t,x, * k is computed via
If Ψ and γ do not depend on x, and ψ of i) is equal to (Ψ, γ), namely,
holds for any k ∈ T t and any u k ∈ l 2 F (k; R m ). Here, u t,x | T k and u t,x | T k+1 are the restrictions of u t,x on T k and T k+1 , respectively; and X t,x, * k is computed via
is called a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx , if the following two points hold: a) Φ does not depend on x, and v t,x depends on x;
are given, respectively, by
The state X t,x, * k in (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) is computed via 
Remark 2.5. By the definition, a mixed equilibrium solution (Φ, v t,x ) is time consistent along X t,x, * , namely, for any k ∈ T t , (Φ, v t,x )| T k is a mixed equilibrium solution for the initial pair (k, X t,x, * k The following lemma describes the cost difference formula under control perturbation.
where
and the backward stochastic difference equation (BS∆E, for short)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. The following statements are equivalent:
i) Problem (LQ) tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution.
ii) There exists a pair (Φ,
and the convexity condition
Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, (Φ, v t,x ) given in ii) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
Proof. This follows from the definition and Lemma 3.1.
To proceed, we first study the expression of Y k,Φ of (3.8) under some additional condition.
t,x k being deterministic, then the backward state Y k,Φ of (3.8) has the following expression:
Proof. See Appendix B.
For a matrix M ∈ R n×m , let M † be its Moore-Penrose inverse. Then, we have the following lemma [1] .
Lemma 3.4. Let matrices L, M , and N be given with appropriate size. Then, LXM = N has a solution X if and only if
where V is a matrix with appropriate size.
Here, Ran(N ) is the range of N . The following theorem is concerned with the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution. ii) There exists Φ ∈ l 2 (T t ; R m×n ) such that the following assertions hold.
a) The coupled equations
are solvable in the sense of
b) The condition
and
Furthermore, under condition ii), let 12) and Φ k , Γ k , k ∈ T t , are given in ii); then, (Φ, v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.5, the solvability of (3.9) is to characterize the convexity (3.7), while (3.10) is to characterize the stationary condition (3.6) 
can be further constructed. Noting (3.11), it is impossible to determine the value of Φ k by using the property
t,x ) that satisfies condition ii) of Theorem 3.5 is a mixed equilibrium solution. Nevertheless, the freedom of selecting Φ could enable us to deal with the open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy in a unified way.
From Theorem 3.5, the following two corollaries are straightforward. The first concerns the open-loop equilibrium control, which is obtained by letting Φ = 0 in Theorem 3.5. ii) The following assertions hold.
is satisfied. Here, X t,x, * is computed via
Furthermore, under condition ii), the control
is an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) tx .
Note that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy has nothing to do with the initial state x. The second corollary is concerned with the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which is obtained by letting Γ k = 0, k ∈ T t in Theorem 3.5. ii) The following assertions hold.
and L k , θ k , k ∈ T t are given by
where ii) The following statements are equivalent: d) Problem (LQ) tx admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy. e) O k ≻ 0, k ∈ T t , namely, O k , k ∈ T t , are all positive definite, which are given in (3.16). f ) For any k ∈ T t and any ξ ∈ l 2 F (k; R n ), Problem (LQ) kξ admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
Proof. i). a)⇔b). Let v t,x be an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) tx . In this case, (3.6) becomes
Mimicking the proof of Theorem 3.5 and based on Lemma 3.4, a control of the following form
also satisfies (3.18), where V k ∈ R m is deterministic and X t,x, * , θ k are given by
Combining the solvability of (3.13), we know that any control of the form (3.19) is an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) tx . Therefore, Problem (LQ)
ii). d)⇔e). Let (Φ, v) be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . O k 0, k ∈ T k follows from the solvability of (3.16). We now prove that O k , k ∈ T k are all invertible. Note that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is independent of x. If some of O k , k ∈ T k , are singular, then similar to those of a)⇒b), v can be selected as any one of the following forms:
In (3.20), V k ∈ R m , k ∈ T t , are deterministic, and θ k is given by
Therefore, Problem (LQ) tx admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy if and only if O k , k ∈ T k are all invertible, and thus are positive definite. e)⇒f) and f)⇒d) are obvious. This completes the proof. Remark 3.10. Problem (LQ) tx admitting a unique open-loop equilibrium control is a local property, which is only of the unique existence for the fixed initial pair (t, x). Interestingly, this local property could ensure a semi-global property, namely, for any k ∈ T t (after t) and any ξ ∈ l 2 F (k; R n ), Problem (LQ) kξ also admits a unique open-loop equilibrium control. A similar property also holds for the linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
The case with all of the initial pairs
Simply knowing that Problem (LQ) tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control or a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, it is hard or generally impossible to derive sharp results like those of Theorem 3.9. Alternatively, in this section, we consider the case that the initial pair is allowed to vary. To begin, we first state the results for the open-loop equilibrium control. ii) The coupled equations
Proof. ii)⇒i). From the solvability of (3.22) and (3.23), we know that (3.14) holds for any (t, x). Therefore, i) holds.
i)⇒ii). Note that (3.14) is equivalent to
As for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ) Problem (LQ) tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control, we must have the solvability of (3.21)-(3.23).
The following result is for the feedback equilibrium strategy. i) For any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
ii) The coupled equations
such that for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), (Φ, v)| Tt is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . Here, (Φ, v)| Tt is the restriction of (Φ, v) on T t . iv) There exists a ψ ∈ F T such that for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), ψ| Tt is a feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) tx . Here, ψ| Tt is the restriction of ψ on T t .
Furthermore, under any of the above conditions, the pair (Φ t , v t ) with
We now consider the mixed equilibrium solution. If it exists, we have some freedom to select the purefeedback-strategy part of the mixed equilibrium solution, as pointed out in Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.13, we have the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the existence of a mixed equilibrium solution for all of the initial pairs. Because different initial pairs may correspond to different pure-feedback-strategy parts of the mixed equilibrium solution, the condition of Theorem 3.13 is for the case that specifies the pure-feedback-strategy part Φ. i) For any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a mixed equilibrium solution and the pure-feedback-strategy part is Φ| Tt . Here, Φ ∈ l 2 (T; R m×n ) and Φ| Tt is the restriction of Φ on T t .
ii) There exists Φ ∈ l 2 (T; R m×n ) such that the following difference equations
Under condition ii) and for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), (Φ| Tt , v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
Proof. ii)⇒i). This follows from Theorem 3.5.
i)⇒ii). In this case, for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), the pure-feedback-strategy part of the mixed equilibrium solution is Φ| Tt . Note that (3.10 
Therefore, (3.9), (3.27), and (3.28) are solvable.
To end this section, we pose the following assumption.
The following result is straightforward.
Theorem 3.14. Letting (H) hold, then O k , k ∈ T, are all positive definite. Furthermore, for any t ∈ T and any x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ), Problem (LQ) tx admits a unique feedback equilibrium strategy (Φ, v) with
Proof. A simple calculation shows that (3.24) is equal to (3.24) and (3.25) are solvable. This completes the proof.
An example
Consider a discrete-time stochastic LQ problem, whose system dynamics and cost functional are given, respectively, by 
and {w k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3} is a martingale difference with constant second-order conditional moment E k (w 
, and based on Corollary 3.8 and Theorem 3.12, the feedback equilibrium strategy of this LQ problem must not exist.
Mixed equilibrium solution
We use the command "randn" of MATLAB to randomly generate Φ = {Φ k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3}. Note that
, and let
By performing the iterations (3.9)-(3.27)-(3.28), we select 10 ψs and get the corresponding Os and Os, For all 10 cases, O k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all positive, and O k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3 are all invertible. Then, due to Theorem 3.13, for any (t, x) with t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R 2 ), the above 10 cases correspond to 10 mixed equilibrium solutions of the considered LQ problem, which can be easily constructed from Theorem 3.13. For example, with the last ψ given above, the mixed equilibrium solution is as follows. Let 
Then, (Φ, v 0,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution of this LQ problem for the initial pair (0, x), where Φ = {Φ k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3}.
Summary
In this paper, the notion of mixed equilibrium solution is introduced for the time-inconsistent discretetime mean-field stochastic LQ optimal control. For a pair of pure-feedback strategy and open-loop control, necessary and sufficient conditions are given to ensure that such a pair is a mixed equilibrium solution. On this basis, the open-loop equilibrium control and feedback equivalent strategy can be dealt with in a unified way.
Although we provide some relevant results, the theory for mixed equilibrium solution is far from mature. From the example in Section 4, we know that a remarkable property of mixed equilibrium solution is its non-uniqueness. Thus, we propose that the following topics warrant further study: i) Characterize the set of all of the mixed equilibrium solutions of Problem (LQ).
ii) Find the "best" mixed equilibrium solution, which should be the one under which the equilibrium value function attains its extreme.
iii) As a test, the multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection must be thoroughly investigated.
iv) Finally, the analysis should be extended beyond the realm of the LQ controls and to a continuous-time setting.
A Proof of Lemma 3.1
From (2.6) and (3.3), we have
From (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that
From (A.1), we can complete the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 3.3
By simple calculation, we have
In the above, we apply the propertyv t,x ∈ l 2 (T t ; R m ). By deduction, we can get the desired result.
C Proof of Theorem 3.5 i)⇒ii). Let (Φ, v t,x ) be a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx , which satisfies (3.6) and (3.7). By simple calculation, we have
From (3.7) and (C.1), it holds that
which implies O k 0. Then, (3.9) is solvable.
We now prove b) and c). Letting k = N − 1 in (3.6) and noting
Here, X
Note that (Φ, v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution and X t,x, * is given in (2.8).
satisfies (C.3), it holds from Lemma 3.4 that (C.3) is equivalent to
Clearly, (C.5) is equivalent to
then the new pair (Φ, v t,x ) with v 7) ), the equations in (C.3) are also satisfied. Therefore, the v
(C.8)
In this case, it holds that
Therefore, we have
The following argument is similar to that between (C.4) and (C.8). Note that (Φ, v t,x ) is a mixed equilibrium solution and X t,x, * is given in ( By repeating the procedure between (C.2) and (C.11), we have the properties b) and c).
ii)⇒i). For k ∈ T, (C.1) and O k 0, we have
which implies (3.7). Furthermore, based on Lemma 3.4 and by reversing the procedure of i)⇒ii), we can assert that (Φ, v t,x ) with v t,x given in (3.12) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ) tx .
D Proof of Theorem 3.12 i)⇔ii). Note that (3.17) is equivalent to
t,x, * k + θ k , k ∈ T t . Letting k = t and taking different xs, we have O t O † t L t = L t , O t O † t θ t = θ t . Because for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 F (t; R n ) Problem (LQ) tx admits a linear feedback equilibrium strategy, we must have the solvability of (3.24)-(3.25). Furthermore, from the solvability of (3.24)-(3.25), it is not hard to confirm the existence of a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
Then, for any (t, x) with t ∈ T and x ∈ l 2 (t; R n ), (Φ, v)| Tt is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
iii)⇒iv). Let ψ = (Φ, v). Then, this ψ satisfies the property of iv).
iv)⇒ii). We adopt a backward procedure to prove ii). Assume we have obtained ψ ℓ = ( Φ ℓ , v ℓ ), ℓ ∈ T k+1 , namely, ψ(z) = Φ ℓ z + v ℓ , with (Φ ℓ , v ℓ ) ∈ R m×n × R m . Let us derive the expression of ψ k . Now, consider Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (k, x). By adding to and Then, it holds that
